This research analyses airlines' pricing decisions in response to changes in the market conditions. We estimate the effects of jet fuel price changes on European airfares at airline/route level by discriminating on the grounds of supplied capacity and markets' competitive structure. Our results show that airlines tend to adjust fares asymmetrically following a "rocket and feather" behaviour. The asymmetric pricing is marked in periods of decreasing capacity when the increases of fuel price are passed at a higher degree than fuel cost savings. In contrast, when capacity increases the asymmetry is lowered. Moreover, we show that highly competitive markets are characterized by a lower price asymmetry compared to low competition markets. Finally, our results show that airline price asymmetry reaches its maximum when capacity is reduced and competition is low.
Introduction
A relevant topic in the airline industry is whether airlines succeed in passing through cost changes to their fares. It is relevant for airlines, whose volatility in cost levels (especially in fuel cost) is a source of significant risk (Borenstein, 2011b) . It is extremely important for regulators, whose policy interventions' effects depend to what extent charges are born by airlines rather than by passengers paying higher fares (Koopmans and Lieshout, 2016) . It is attention grabbing for popular press, especially during periods in which consumers complain about raising airfares despite plunging oil prices (The Guardian, 2015, The Wall Street Journal, 2015). Finally, it is vital for antitrust authorities, which constantly monitor competition levels in the airline industry, especially after the recent period of major carriers' consolidation (The Economist, 2015). Recently, concerns about possible uncompetitive dynamics in the industry have gained ground among consumers and policy makers as demonstrated by the remarks of US senator Charles E. Schumer who declared: "the industry often raises prices in a flash when oil prices spike, yet they appear not to be adjusting for the historic decline in the cost of fuel; ticket prices should not shoot up like a rocket and come down like a feather" (The New York Times, 2015) . This recalls to Bacon (1991) who termed "rocket and feathers" the pattern of asymmetric price adjustments of retail gasoline prices to cost changes. Despite such relevance, the empirical evidence on airline price asymmetries in response to cost changes is limited and mainly focused on US data. The aim of this paper is to shed light on carriers' response to input price changes in the European airline industry. The focus is on fuel prices that, together with labour costs, are the major factors driving the changes in airlines' input prices (Scotti and Volta, 2017) . Specifically, the importance of fuel price is mainly due to its volatility: while the trend of labour costs is typically increasing on the long period (Dennis, 2007) , the impact of volatile fuel price is less predictable playing a determinant role in airline' short terms input price change (Franke and John, 2011) . This is demonstrated by the fact that airlines hedge a portion of their fuel needs to reduce the swings in profits (Morrell and Swan, 2006) . As a further confirmation of the key role of fuel costs, the US Department of Justice began an investigation in June 2015 on major US carriers accused to have saved billions of dollars on fuel without passing these savings to the passengers (The Washington Post, 2015).
Economic theory on pricing behaviour tells that, in a context of profit maximizing firms, a general rule is that firms will charge a relative mark-up on marginal costs. Such mark-up depends on the elasticity of the demand that in turn is affected by the demand shape and the market structure. When firms face a change in their costs the way in which it is passedthrough to consumers depends on the type of cost (firm specific or industry-wide), and on the firm market power. When analysing the airline industry, many papers refer to the airlines industry as highly competitive, hence considering a symmetric pass-through rate of 100%. 1 Few other contributions (e.g. Forsyth and Gillen, 2007; Forsyth, 2008 and Oxera, 2003) consider the aviation markets as oligopolies assuming a significantly lower rate. A comprehensive review on the topic is provided in Koopmans and Lieshout (2016) , who discuss the expected behaviour of airlines according to market characteristics. The authors consider market routes as differentiated oligopolies where airlines compete choosing their flight schedules first (as firms choosing their quantities in a Cournot model) and then adapting their fares to the demand levels. The authors conclude that empirical studies on airline pass-through rate are however limited mainly due to lack of detailed ticket fare data. Among these few empirical analyses we mention Wadud (2015) and Cannon and Watanabe (2016) . Wadud (2015) analyses US time series data finding evidence of asymmetry in the pass-through rate. According to his results, increases in fares are quicker when fuel price increases and slower when the fuel price decreases. Cannon and Watanabe (2016) analyse US air transport industry finding evidence of asymmetric pricing in periods of contracting demand, with airlines bearing fuel cost increases while passing through fuel cost savings. Despite the important contributions, the abovementioned researches exhibit the not negligible limitation of using data aggregated at carrier or industry level hence not capturing the market (i.e. routes) heterogeneity in terms of market characteristics.
2 By using route level data, our aim is to fill this gap by estimating and analysing airlines pricing behaviours in different market conditions.
The Issues
It is widely acknowledged that airline managers adjust ticket fares on the basis of fuel price (Brueckner and Zhang, 2010; Borenstein and Rose, 2014) . Anecdotal evidence suggests that airlines are rather reluctant to pass the cost reductions as equally as they pass cost increases (The Telegraph, 2016). In the economic literature, this kind of asymmetry is also termed "positive" and describes a situation in which firms react more and/or quicker when inputs' prices increase than when decreasing (i.e. positive asymmetry is not desirable from a consumer perspective). Oppositely, when firms react more and/or quicker after inputs' prices decreases, the asymmetry is defined as "negative". Studies on asymmetric price transmission in various industries have found evidence for rockets-and-feathers behavior (see for example Peltzman, 2000) . Generally, the main proposed causes of asymmetric pricing are found to be the exercise of market power and/or industry-specific factors (Zachmann and von Hirschhausen, 2008) . Many authors have suggested that market power generally leads to positive asymmetric price transmission (Meyer and Cramon-Taubadel, 2004) . In this regard, European airline industry with few airlines serving OD connections (i.e. a close approximation of an oligopolistic market) may be a perfect breeding ground for it. However, Bailey and Brorsen (1989) and Ward (1982) show that also negative asymmetry may be associated with market power and, therefore, it is not possible to ascertain its type a priori. 3 Some recent research seems to support the general idea of asymmetric price adjustments in the airline industry: Wadud (2015) finds positive asymmetry; Cannon and Watanabe (2016) negative asymmetry. In a paper on asymmetric pricing in the gasoline market, Borenstein et al. (1997) provide three further explanations for price asymmetries: (i) tacit collusion with imperfect monitoring, (ii) finite inventories and (iii) consumer search cost. Similarly, Hong and Lee (2014), investigating retail gasoline market, point out that the main causes of positive asymmetry are consumer search cost and tacit collusion. More specifically, the authors show how tacit collusion facilitates the link between market power and asymmetric pricing. This relation may be of interest in the airline industry. On the contrary, consumer search costs seem to be negligible given the existence of online travel search engines. Finally, the issue of finite inventories drives the attention on airlines' capacity. In this regard, Noel (2008) underlines that capacity constraints reduce the incentives to undercut prices (strategy on which is based a further potential explanation of asymmetry, i.e. Edgeworth price cycles, that therefore we do not consider). Summarizing, we consider market power, capacity and their interaction as possible sources of asymmetry in airline's pricing.
When analyzing airline industry the asymmetric pricing evidence is still limited. Accordingly, our first hypothesis examines whether such asymmetry exists in Europe:
H1 -European airfares are adjusted asymmetrically and the asymmetry is positive.
In the case our hypothesis H1 is corroborated, our interest moves towards the study of the factors potentially influencing such behavior. More specifically, we study whether airlines are generally simply reluctant to pass on fuel savings, or whether they adopt different conducts on the basis of non-pricing strategic choices and of specific market conditions. Concerning airlines' strategies, the existing literature suggests that airlines can justify shifts in the selling price by changing capacity (Cannon and Watanabe, 2016) . Indeed, according to airline managers, industry capacity is the dominant factor in determining airfares (Hazel, 2018) . If setting capacity is seen as a mere instrument to anticipate demand, we may expect that airfares are influenced but not the pass-through rate of fuel cost (i.e. after controlling for the effect of capacity change on airfares change). However, airlines' discretion in setting capacity levels may have a whole other meaning in the light of the recent debate on the socalled "capacity discipline". Keeping capacity low compared to historical levels is a strategy initially embraced by airlines to respond to the global economic downturn and high and volatile fuel prices. This strategy has been then maintained in presence of economic recovery and more stable fuel prices (Wittman and Swelbar, 2014) . Such a trend has been observed at a global level and recently defined by CAPA (2013) as a "new global religion" leading to improved airline profitability. The idea that limiting capacity may be an instrument to increase ticket prices brings into play the issue of airlines market power and tacit collusion. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Justice has been investigating major U.S. airlines for evidence of collusion by limiting their growth as part of an effort to keep ticket prices high. 4 In this regard, Hazel (2018) underlines that capacity reductions of single airlines may be seen as the result of a sort of cooperative strategy leading to market power gains towards passengers. If so, capacity changes should exert an influence on inputs' price transmissions and this idea leads to our second hypothesis:
H2 -In period of contracting capacity, airlines achieve market power gains that allows for higher positive price asymmetry.
With respect to market power, a further factor worthy of investigation is the level of competition. The theoretical paper by Weyl and Fabinger (2013) demonstrates that in a symmetric oligopoly the intensity of competition is one of the factors affecting input price transmission. However, this does not automatically convert into asymmetric behaviours. Indeed, Duso and Szücs (2017) , analysing the German electricity market, find incomplete price transmission but not evidence of price asymmetries. In our context, despite the above mentioned general high level of concentration, there exist differences across European routes (e.g. from monopoly routes to highly competitive ones) which may create heterogeneity in airlines' reaction to cost changes. In general, higher market shares may facilitate coordination to the detriment of competition (Borenstein, 2011a) leading to positive asymmetries. Price asymmetries more pronounced in low competitive markets would support the concerns of policy makers and consumers regarding airlines profiteering from fuel savings. Accordingly, our third hypothesis investigates differences in asymmetries due to market competition levels:
H3 -Price asymmetries are influenced by the level of market competition.
Assume now that both H2 and H3 are corroborated. In this case, higher market concentrations may facilitate capacity coordination. Different influences of capacity reductions should be observed depending on the market competition levels, with airline market power reaching its maximum when competition is low and capacity is reduced. If price asymmetries are mainly influenced by the combination of market structure and capacity discipline, this may pose a threat to the efficiency of the markets. Coherently, our fourth hypothesis is:
H4 -The combinations of capacity discipline and market competition lead to different levels of price asymmetries.
Data
We use the Marketing Information Data Transfer (MIDT) provided by OAG traffic analyser as principal source for the data. The data set contains monthly booking numbers and the associated average booked ticket fares for each airline serving each European origin and destination airports. 5 Booked fares do not include additional government taxes, airport fees, airlines surcharges and ancillary revenues. We therefore consider the base fare which can be dynamically adjusted by airlines according to markets characteristics. We notice that most of the airlines implemented a fuel surcharge during the exceptional increase of oil prices (e.g. during the 2007-2008 crude oil price peak). These fees are carrier specific and in some cases were never levied (e.g. Ryanair), while in many other cases they were converted during low crude oil prices into other form of carrier-imposed charges (e.g. British Airways and Air France) or international/domestic surcharges (e.g. Lufthansa), hence losing any connection with their original purpose. Our analysis is not considering the evolution of these surcharges which, if the case, need to be considered on top of our results. Other variables provided by OAG comprehend the operating airline, the number and the location of the stops and the total trip distance. Data are collected from global distribution systems information (GDSs), hence bookings made directly through airlines are not included. However, OAG corrects the information in order to estimate the real size of the relevant markets. OAG schedule analyser is the source for the capacity (in terms of available seats) deployed by a specific airline on a specific route. To build our dataset, we matched the information from the two OAG databases. It is important to remark that the OAG schedule analyser dataset does not provide information on the capacity for indirect flights (i.e. one or more stops), hence our data only includes direct flights information. The sample we consider comprehends monthly observations from February 2010 to December 2015 of bookings at airline level between European airports. 6 To ensure the quality of the sample, we cleaned the data by deleting obvious miscoding (i.e. duplicates, zero fares, bookings or distance) and by removing outliers (i.e. fare must be at least 25$ and the monthly number of bookings at least 100). Starting from the booking data, we calculate a monthly HHI index to measure the degree of competition for each origin and destination city pairs (i.e. considering in competition direct and indirect routes serving the same airport system). Unfortunately, we were not able to retrieve the specific fuel price for each of the airlines considered. We therefore approximate the fuel price by collecting the monthly average U.S. Gulf Coast Kerosene-Type Jet Fuel Spot Price (US dollars per gallon) sourced from the US Energy Information Administration. Despite airline fuel prices may differ in the absolute values, it is however reasonable to expect that prices variations are following the underlying jet fuel spot price. We acknowledge that airline practice of fuel hedging may create unpredictable distortions in the analysis, however airline fuel prices and hedging contracts (in Europe) are confidential and almost impossible to retrieve (especially if collected at monthly basis). Figure 1 presents the relation between jet fuel spot price (grey line) and the average ticket fares (black line) computed from our European sample. The two variables show a general strong relation. Such connection is evident at the end of 2014, when jet fuel prices experienced a significant fall on the back of continuing growth in global supply of crude oil. Air travel services, especially passenger and freight services, are known to be fairly seasonal with volumes rising in spring, summer, and the early fall. This variability can be depicted in Figure 1 by the airfares falls during the winter months and the peaks during the summer periods. To allow for the estimation of price asymmetries, we therefore compute the change of the variables with respect to the same month of the previous year. By computing such change (i.e. /( − 12)) we avoid possible biases due to the seasonal fluctuations. The final dataset used in the analysis is composed of 433,619 observations (decreasing to 282,709 when considering the delta changes) which are describing ≃15,000 unique city pairs served by ≃125 airlines over a 59 months period. Despite the large number of observations, our panel data set is un-balanced (due to routes ceasing or starting during the period considered) and presents time gaps (mainly because of the presence of seasonal routes). Table 2 presents the data statistics for the variables and their changes. The last four columns of the table present the mean values for the sub-samples of increasing and decreasing fuel price and capacity. Our full sample show an average increase in ticket fares (+2%) and capacity offered (+7%), while a decrease in jet fuel price (-2%) and competition level (HHI +4%). 56% of our observations have been exposed to decreasing fuel prices and 49% to capacity contractions. Figure 2 plots the average changes ( /( − 12)) for the variables considered.
Figure 2 -Average variable changes ( /( − ))
Jet fuel price (solid grey line) shows the highest average change during the period, with the average change in ticket fares (solid black line) following a similar but smoothed trend. The average capacity change (dash black line) shows a smaller variation remaining constantly above the unit for the whole period. Similarly, the average HHI change (dash grey line) remains constant and close to the unit for the whole period. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the HHI index for the routes considered in our sample. We compute the HHI index based on the booking number for both direct and indirect routes up to two stops which are serving the same airport system (i.e. we consider in competition routes serving the same OD cities). Over the 433,619 observations considered, around 25,000 are served as a monopoly (i.e. HHI=1). The average HHI is 0.55 which is slightly higher than an index generated by 2 carriers having equal market shares on the same market. The first and third HHI quartiles are 0.35 and 0.72, respectively, hence describing the European market as highly concentrated. However, we have to consider that the data are sourced from GDSs information and, although adjusted by OAG, may not include the total demand levels biasing upwards the HHI index. To control for this possibility, we estimate our models considering different thresholds when defining the competition variables.
Figure 3 -HHI index distribution 4 Methodology
Our panel data estimation approach is based on the mark-up theory, with airfares set as a function of the costs incurred and of shifter variables. Two main factors may affect the level of mark-up: the capacity supplied (Cannon, 2014) and the level of competition in the market (Koopmans and Lieshout, 2016) . We therefore include two variables describing the level of the capacity supplied and the level of concentration on the specific route. 7 The airfare ( , ) basic equation for each airline = 1, … , serving the origin destination = 1, … , (origindestination airports' pairs) in a specific time period = 1, … , can be expressed as:
Where the variable , describes the capacity deployed by the airline on the route at time ,
, defines the competition on the route at time , and , is the idiosyncratic error term. A set of controls for the airline , the route , the month , and the year are included to take into account the observations' characteristics. Arguably, the airfares response to costs changes may not be immediate but distributed over time. Long and short term adjustments are usually estimated through the mostly used time series error correction models (e.g. Bachmeier and Griffin, 2003, Karagiannis et al. 2015) . However, our panel dataset is not fitting a time-series approach since our disaggregated observations are spanned over a relative short period and presenting time gaps (e.g. seasonal routes, starting/ceasing routes, missing data, etc.). In order to estimate short and long-run equilibria and the adjustment speed, the observations need to be aggregated at a higher level (e.g. airlines level) and collected over a longer time period. However, a higher level of aggregation would not allow for the study of price asymmetries in different market condition (to be observed at OD level), which is the scope our research. We therefore pursue the estimation of short term adjustments (as in Li and Stock, 2017) expressing equation (1) + , (2) Where the subscript k=0,…,K indicates the number of time lags considered. As in the standard distributed lag model, the parameters 1, − represent the transmission of costs in a specific k-th time lag, while the sum over k of the parameters 1, − (i.e. the cumulative parameter) indicates the total transmission of costs into airfares. However, the parameters 1, − of equation (2) are the estimated symmetric impact over the airfares ( , ) and cannot be used to discriminate between inputs' prices increases and decreases. To allow for an asymmetric relation, we firstly modify equation (2) by considering the changes in the variables between months. Specifically, given the seasonality characteristics of air transport, we express the variables as changes between and the same month in the previous year ( − 12). When considering variable time differences, the time invariant variables are null and can be dropped from the equation. In our case, the control variables on the airline ( ), the route ( ), and the month ( ) can be eliminated since they do not change over time across our observations. Similarly, when considering the costs' changes over time, only the highly volatile fuel price may have an impact on the change of the airfares charged by the same airline on the same route. Indeed, the other major variable components of airlines' costs at route level (e.g. crew costs, taxes, catering) are almost invariant. 8 Finally, with respect to the year dummies, the term ( − ( −12) ) is not null and can be reparametrized as . Applying the logarithms to the non-dummy variables, we can rewrite equation (2) where delta (∆) stands for the logarithmic differences of each variable. The parameters of equation (3) evaluate the impact of independent variables changes over the change in airfares. In order to consider the possible asymmetric impact of fuel price changes, we multiply the fuel term by two dummy variables capturing the fuel price evolution: . In order to test our second hypothesis, we further disaggregate the fuel change impact by considering the case in which the capacity deployed is changing over the period as in equation (4) (6) where , and , are two dummy variables describing the competition levels of the specific route at time . , equal to one is describes routes with high competition, while , equal to one describes low competition routes. Differences between the coefficients would highlight heterogeneous asymmetries ascribed to market concentration levels (i.e. Hypothesis H3). As for equation (4) , also the dummies in equation (5) and (6) are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Finally, we further disaggregate the effect by considering the effects of both capacity changes and competition levels: (7) Equation (7) combines the dummies defined for equations (5) and (6). By testing the differences in the parameters, it is possible to evaluate the combined effects of the specific conditions according to Hypothesis H4.
Results
The parameters of the equations 3-7 are estimated with an OLS estimator within a robust framework in order to control for possible heteroscedasticity. As in Peltzman (2000), we included as many lags (K) as needed to describe statistically significant price adjustments processes. Specifically, we included = 1 lags because the addition of more lags resulted in not significant coefficients. 9 All the non-dummy variables are transformed in logarithms and the coefficients reported can be read as elasticities. Table 2 reports the estimates of the equation 3, which analyses the symmetric impact of fuel price changes over airfare changes.
The column "Coefficient" shows the estimated parameters for = 0, while the "Lag1 Coefficient" column shows the parameter estimated for = 1. The cumulative coefficients reported are computed as the sum of the two coefficients and represent the total impact of the specific variable on the airfares. All the variables considered are statistically significant at 1% showing the expected signs. An increase in supplied capacity ( 9 We note that our distributed lag model is defined in differences, hence = 1 lags corresponds to two changes over the time: ( − 12) ⁄ and ( − 1) ( − 13) ⁄ . ∆ , ) results in lower airfares: given a downward sloping demand curve for air travel and an upward sloping supply curve, an increase in supplied capacity results in lower airfares ceteris paribus. As expected, route concentration increases are associated with an increase in airfares. This may confirm that highly concentrated oligopolistic markets may ease coordination to the detriment of competition (Borenstein, 2011a) . Concerning the impact of fuel price changes, our model estimates that on average a 1% change in fuel prices leads to a cumulative 0.42% change in ticket prices. As already highlighted, the coefficient is not distinguishing between periods of fuel price increase or decrease not capturing potential asymmetric reaction of airfares to fuel price changes. Possible asymmetric reactions are considered in equation 4, whose estimates are reported in Table 3 . Examining the impact of our variables of interest (i.e. the cumulative parameters 2 + and 2 − ), the association between fare level changes and fuel price changes are statistically different from zero and concordant given the positive signs of coefficients 2 + and 2 − . 10 However, the estimated values of the two coefficients are different: an increase of 1% in fuel price leads to a cumulative increase in the fare level of 0.78%, while a 1% decrease in fuel price leads to a notably smaller cumulative decrease (0.11%) in the airfares. A Wald test confirms the significant difference between the two parameters corroborating the hypothesis of asymmetric adjustment of airfares with respect to changes in fuel prices (Hypothesis H1). On average, our results show that airlines may be profiteering from fuel savings. Moreover, the estimates show a significant difference in adjustments process with the lagged coefficients only statistically significant in the case of fuel price increases. This behaviour may be however different with respect to the different market conditions. Table 4 presents the estimates of equation 5 which disaggregates the fuel changes with respect to direction of capacity change. The coefficients associated with capacity, HHI and year dummies are robust and similar to the results reported in Table 2 and 3, confirming as well the rocket and feather behaviour (positive asymmetry). Moreover, in periods of capacity contractions ( − ) we observe that, ceteris paribus, fuel price increases are passed to the passengers at a higher degree than in periods of capacity increases ( + ). Indeed, an increase of 1% of fuel prices during capacity decreases leads to a cumulative increase of 0.80% of ticket prices, while, the cumulative increase associated to fuel price and capacity increases is significantly lower and equal 0.77%. In case of fuel price decreasing, results suggest a similar but smoothed behaviour with airlines passing lower savings in case of capacity contractions (0.11%) with respect to periods of capacity increases (0.12%). However, in this case the two coefficients are not significantly different. The result may suggest that capacity contractions increase airlines market power only in period of fuel price growth. Nevertheless, this is sufficient to corroborate the hypothesis of higher positive price asymmetry (H2).
The level of competition may be a factor affecting price transmission as well as price asymmetry. In this regard, Table 5 presents the results when estimating the asymmetries considering different competition levels (equation 6). More precisely, the price changes are estimated for routes showing high and low degrees of competition (i.e. high competition, = 1 if < 0.5). When analysing the parameters of interest, table 5 confirms the asymmetric pricing behaviour. Moreover, we observe that in periods of fuel price increase ( + ) airfares have a statistical significant higher cumulative increase in low competition markets (0.80%) compared to the high competitive ones (0.77%). Similarly, in period of fuel price decrease ( − ), the estimates suggest that in low competition markets airlines are passing a slightly lower level of savings compared to the high competitive ones (0.14%, 0.08%). We check the robustness of these results by changing thresholds defining the low and high competition dummies (i.e. and ). To this extent, figures 4a-4b show the different estimated parameters (y -axis) with respect to different HHI threshold defining the low and high competition dummies (x -axis) ( Table 5 uses the 0.5 thresholds). Figure 4a presents the results for fuel price increase parameters, while figure 4b the estimates for the decreasing period. Figure 4a shows that, in case of fuel price increase, the spread between the parameters increases accordingly with the increase in the HHI threshold (Wald tests on the parameters' differences show statistically significance). Indeed, when increasing the threshold from 0.5 to 0.9 (i.e. = 1 when < 0.9) the cumulative parameter associated to low competition moves from 0.80 to 0.84. In other words, moving towards a monopolistic situation the airlines increase the pass-through of costs taking advantage of their increasing market power. Similar results are obtained in the case of fuel price decrease (Figure 4b ), where the cumulative parameters diverge for high HHI thresholds. 11 Our hypothesis H3 is confirmed: price asymmetries differ with respect to competition levels.
The last step of our analysis is to estimate the combined effect of capacity changes and competitive levels. Table 6 reports the estimates of equation 7. The model further disaggregates the fuel price variable by considering the combined effect of capacity changes and competition levels (i.e. = 1 when < 0.5). Results are in line with previous estimations, showing positive asymmetry with respect to fuel price changes. Generally, fuel price increases are passed at a higher degree in case of contraction in capacity and low competition markets (a cumulative 0.823), while savings are passed at a higher degree in situation of high competition and capacity increase (a cumulative 0.153). These behaviours can be depicted when analysing the evolution of the parameters with respect to different competition levels. We estimate equation 7 using different thresholds for the dummy variables and . Results are presented in figures 5a (increasing fuel price periods) and 5b (decreasing fuel price periods). Figure 5a shows that airlines' market power reaches its maximum in situation of capacity reduction and low competition (red line). This effect increases with the increase of the HHI threshold. On the opposite, the lowest market power is produced by combining capacity increase and high competition (green line), with the cumulative parameters remaining similar despite the HHI threshold. When combining capacity increase (decrease) with low (high) competition, the cumulative parameters are the results of conflicting effects. The estimations show similar fuel price transmissions (blue and yellow lines) lying in between the two others cases. Summarising, during periods of fuel price increases, the combination of capacity change and competition levels may result in different price transmissions (H4). Figure 5b shows different results. Indeed, in cases of fuel price reduction, the differences in price transmission ascribable to capacity states are small (with the only exceptions of high HHI thresholds coefficients in low competitive markets). Generally, the reduced importance of capacity in case of fuel price reduction is in line with the result obtained from Equation 5 . This result may be interpreted as a signal of the fact that, when pressure on margins relaxes and there is room for increasing profits, capacity coordination among airlines is more difficult (i.e. feasible only in very highly concentrated market). 12 The estimates of equations (4)- (7) show the price elasticities and not the pass-through level itself. Indeed, it is not straightforward to move from the estimated elasticities to the corresponding pass-through value since fuel cost is only one of the components of the airfare. However, some considerations may help in this regard. For example, Stalnaker et al. (2016) show that fuel expenses range between the 17% and 38% of passenger revenues. Based on such considerations, on average we can expect that elasticities between 0.2 and 0.4 may be interpreted as a pass-through rate of ≃100%. Our base estimates (i.e. Table 3) , assuming the 0.4 elasticity, show that airlines pass cost increases more than proportionally (on average ≃190% of fuel increases), while retaining most of the fuel savings passing only ≃30% of them. However, the pass-through rate may change significantly with respect to different market conditions. Indeed, when fuel price increase, the estimated pass-through rate ranges from ≃190% in case of capacity increasing and high competition markets to a ≃205% in case of capacity decreasing and low competition markets. In case of fuel price decrease, the estimated pass-through of savings ranges from a ≃20% in case of capacity contracting and low competition to 40% when capacity is growing in high competitive markets (cumulative estimates of Table 6 ). Generally, our results show that airlines tend to act opportunistically either by appropriating a significant part of fuel savings or by increasing their fares more than proportionally in case of fuel price rise. However, we note that a correct estimation of the pass-through rate should consider a more accurate computation of fuel expenses. These expenses may vary between airlines, for example on the basis of fuel purchase agreements. Moreover, airlines locked into hedge contracts can only partially (if not at all) benefit from potential saving coming from a reduction in fuel prices. However, the effects of fuel hedging are unpredictable given that information on contracts are not publicly available.
Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate the dynamics of fuel price change on European airfares taking into account the effect of supplied capacity and the competitive market structure. We apply a distributed lag model describing European airlines/routes level data over the period 2010-2015.
Our results confirm the recent press argument that airlines adjust airfares asymmetrically. On average, the increase of fares is proportionally higher during periods of fuel prices increase than their decrease during fuel prices' contractions following a "rocket and feather" dynamic. Furthermore, our estimates show that positive adjustments are quicker than the negative ones. We extend previous literature by looking at the influence on asymmetry rate exerted by capacity adjustments and competitive pressure. Our results suggest that reductions in capacity can increase airlines' market power and, in turns, the asymmetric pricing behaviour. The role played by capacity reduction is emphasized in low competitive environments during periods of fuel price increases. This may indicate that airlines choices are driven by a sort of cooperative implementation of capacity discipline when coordination is easier (i.e. when competitive pressure is lower). However, the influence of capacity reduction is dampened by route competition and tends to disappear when fuel price decreases. These results may be of interest for the regulatory authorities since we show that airline capability of profiteering on fuel price changes, to the detriment of passengers, is the combined result of capacity change and high concentration at the route level.
The paper has some limitations. Due to the nature of our data (large number of observations, short periods and gaps in the temporal coverage) we do not apply a timeseries approach hence not separating the effects of short and long-time fare adjustments. Moreover, our fuel price variable is considering the market jet fuel spot price which may be not relevant in case of airlines hedging fuel prices. Our estimates may only be analyzed as Please cite as in: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212012217300837 22 general trend and may result being biased for specific airline cases. We therefore invite further research inquiry in this area.
